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The current international regime that regulates maritime oil transport calls for …nancial
contributions by oil …rms once an oil spill has occurred. Their percentage contribution
to the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund depends only on their level of
activity. In this paper, we show that this compensation regime would be more e¢cient
if contributing oil companies adopted …nancial strategies to hedge against oil pollution
risks. The optimal coverage contract is such that standard insurance is useful to man-
age small and medium oil spills, while investments on …nancial markets help to cover
large oil spills, less frequent but much more catastrophic for society. We also show that
the prevention of oil spills increases when insurance is combined with a …nancial hedg-
ing strategy. This positive e¤ect on prevention is sfurther enhanced if …rms have the
opportunity to send signals about their risk-reducing activities to potential investors.
Key-Words: oil spill, legislation, insurance, capital markets, prevention, catastro-
phe.
JEL Classi…cation: D80, G22, Q25.1 Introduction
The maritime transport of oil is regulated by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention in
most countries of the world1, except mainly for the United States, which has its own
Convention2. In this paper, we focus on the compensation system implemented when
an oil spill is registered in the territorial sea of any member of the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention. Since oil spills can create severe damages to the environment but also to
human activities near the coast, they may result in very large claims, which cannot be
covered without a compensation system adapted to such catastrophic losses. Hence,
we will show that the current International regime would bene…t from a reorganization
involving both standard insurance and …nancial hedging. To date, neither standard
insurance nor …nancial hedging were considered as means to improve the indemni…cation
of victims of oil spills. Furthermore, the economic litterature on catastrophic risks does
not provide formal analyses about the impact of hedging on the prevention of large
risks. We examine both of the later in this paper. We also take into account the (bad)
reputational e¤ect that oil …rms have to bear each time an oil spill is announced.
The 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (1992 IOPC Fund) partic-
ipates in the compensation of victims of an oil spill if the payment already granted by
the insurer of the owner of the tanker is not su¢cient. The contributions of oil …rms to
the Fund are proportional to the quantity of oil received in a year and they are due each
time an oil spill has occurred in the territorial waters of a member, whatever the ‡ag of
the tanker and whatever the citizenship of the oil …rm. Hence the IOPC Fund enables
the compensation of victims even if the owner of the tanker is not a citizen of a member
state and empirical evidence shows that the IOPC Fund seems to be rather e¢cient in
minimizingthe time between the oil spill eventand the e¤ective compensation of victims.
However, funds are levied at randomdates and expenses are notsmoothed through time.
Hence we will show that within the current international regime, oil …rms would bene-
181 states rati…ed the 1992 Civil Liability Convention.
2The 1990 Oil Pollution Act. See Ketkar (1995) and Kim (2002) for details on this legislation.
1…t from the capital markets and utilizing appropriate …nancial instruments. Financial
mechanisms improve and complement the hedging provided by insurance policies which
prove to be insu¢cient alone to cover large risks related to maritime oil transport.
There are several reasonswhy the oilindustry should use hedgingmechanismstomake
the current compensation regime more e¢cient. Without adequate risk management, oil
…rms lose e¢ciency in their activities and the cost resulting from this ine¢ciency is
lost to victims’ compensation. In particular, the 1992 IOPC Fund, as it stands, does
not rely on the risk transfer principle. By de…ning contributions on the basis of the
aggregate risk of the pool, only the mutuality principle (Borch, 1962; Wilson, 1968) is
applied. Nevertheless, the aggregate risk is still variable because of the possibly huge
consequences of an incident and because of the limited number of contributing members
in the Fund3. Consequently, the mutuality principle is no longer su¢cient to spread all
the risk on the oil …rms.
Doherty (2000) provides several arguments that insurance is pro…table for …rms, and
stresses the fact that insurance mechanisms have to be completed by some investment on
capital marketswhen dealingwith large risks. Froot(2001)also provides di¤erentreasons
why markets are more e¢cient than insurers in global risk reductions. One important
point is that securitization may reduce transaction costs such as administrative fees or
costs related to agency issues.
In harmony with Dohertyand Dionne (1993), Schlesinger(1999), Doherty and Schlesinger
(2002) and in Mahul (2002), we show that insurance combined with a …nancial hedg-
ing performs better than standard insurance only. However, our economic context is
di¤erent from these studies. In our framework, each individual …rm bears a percentage
of the aggregate risk of the pool (here, the IOPC Fund) and an individual risk of bad
reputation that is positively correlated to the aggregate risk and non insurable. To date,
the litterature has focused essentially on risks that can be split into idiosyncratic risk,
3A large part of total contribution is made by asmall number of oil companies. This can be explained
by the concentration of the oil sector and the exoneration of contributions of companies belonging to
states having rati…ed the 1992 Convention and receiving less then 150,000 tons of oil a year.
2speci…c to the individual and easily insurable, and a systematic risk, independent from
the idiosyncratic one.
Losses induced by reputation constitute an important variable in our model; repu-
tation and its impact on …rms’ value has become a major concern for …rms involved in
environmentally risky activities for the environment as shown by Lanoie et al. (1998)..
This issue is even more crucial for oil companies in the wake of a large oil spill. Hence
taking into account losses induced by (bad) reputation constitutes a progress compared
to the previous literature.
Another important and original point of our analysis deals with prevention, which
is here combined with insurance. This point is important when focusing on the current
discussions that are being held at the European Commission about the evolution of
the …nancing of the IOPC Fund. Especially, it is argued that an increase of individual
contributions may improve the safeness of ships chartered by oil …rms and allow it to
fully compensate the victims of infrequent large oil spills. In contrast to this argument,
we will show that prevention against maritime oil pollution becomes more valuable if oil
…rms apply adequate …nancial strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the current regime of
the IOPC Fund. In the third section, we present the basic model and introduce standard
insurance mechanisms in order to de…ne the optimal insurance contract that an oil …rm
(or the Fund) can buy from an insurer. It entails a deductible with coinsurance for all
losses higher than the deductible. In the fourth section, we show that …nancial hedging
may be a good way to cover the residual risk still retained by oil …rms after insurance.
When incorporating this point in the insurance contract, the risk premium asked by the
insurerdecreases and more (standard) insurance becomes available for small and medium
oil spills, while capital markets are useful for hedging large oil spills. Another important
point is that …nancial markets may provide incentives to invest in prevention by allowing
…rms to give positive signals to potential investors. We end Section 4 by discussing the
characteristics of the …nancial assets that would …t with the mixed hedging strategy
obtained in our model. Section …ve concludes. Proofs are given in Appendix.
32 The IOPC Fund and risk mutualization
In this section we present the main features of the current legislation and we provide
some insights about how the current …nancing of the IOPC Fund can be improved. The
issues we focus on are formalized in Sections 3 and 4.
Since 24 May 2002, International maritime transport (except for the United States)
is exclusively regulated by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC in the course) and
by the 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC Fund) Convention4.
The Fund is …nanced by contributions of the oil industry of member states receiving
more than 150,000 tons of oil per year after sea transport. The contribution of each
company is proportional to the annual tonnage received by sea and is directly payable
to the Fund. Contributions, decided each year by the Assembly of the Fund, cover
administrative costs and estimated compensation payments for passed pollutions. Hence
no provision is made ex ante and each oil …rm pays an ex post indemnity equal to a
percentage of the losses induced by all oil spills registered until this date: The sum
of these oil spills can be considered as the aggregate loss of the IOPC Fund, which is
shared among its members. Note that, under the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, only
the owner of the tanker is held …nancially liable for the catastrophe. The convention
obliges him to buy pollution insurance, provided by P&I Clubs which are non-pro…t
making mutual insurance associations. These mutual groups o¤er insurance depending
on the size of the boat and not directly on the damages that may be induced by a wreck.
Hence, insurance may be limited, as it was the case for the Erika’s wreck on the French
coast in December 1999 (7% of the total available funds).
This International compensation regime seems to be rather e¢cient: It has improved
the protection of sea environment against oil pollution by inducing a decrease of the
numberof large oil spills in the lasttwodecades5. Also, itfacilitates claims settlementfor
4Actually, the …rst Civil Liability Convention dates from 1969 and the Fund was created in 1971.
Both were amended in 1992. For details, see the companion paper of Schmitt and Spaeter (2003)..
5The number of large oil spills (spilling more than 700 tons) was 7.3 per year on average during
4victims of pollution and it has increased the compensation available for them. Although
claimsfordamage to the ecosystemare not admissible, compensation is granted to awide
range of costs (clean-up operations, property damages, economic losses, ...). Besides, it
has been often argued that contributions to the 1992 Fund borne by the oil industry are
fair compared to the revenues induced by oil activities
6.
Nevertheless this regime also shows its limits regarding the total compensation avail-
able for victims7 and the incentives to enhance environmental prevention through the
chartering of safe boats. Indeed, while the shipowner is solely held liable through the
Civil Liability Convention, the whole oil industry participates in compensations through
the IOPC Fund Convention: no direct compensation between the owner of the oil leaked
from the boat and victims can be established. From a theoretical point of view, Ringleb
and Wiggins (1990) show that such considerations may lead …rms to subcontract risky
activities, here the maritime transport of oil, in order to escape from prosecution in the
case of an accident. Moreover, the contribution to the Fund is upper bounded, and this
kind of limited liability may induce oil …rms to charter boats with medium, or even low,
levels of quality.
Besides, the shipowner is alsoprotected by limited liability, which bene…ts mostly low
market value …rms as shown by Dionne and Spaeter (2003) and by Schmitt and Spaeter
(2002).. Consequently, risk-reducing activities may still be worsened.
the 1990s compared to 24.2 during the 1970s. (source : ITOPF Handbook 2003-2004) However, the
level of losses eligible for compensation has increased dramatically in some huge incidents. This can be
explained by the higher than average increase of population in coastal areas and the development of
tourism.
6From 1996 to 2001, the annual contributions represented at most 0,05% of the price per ton of crude
oil received.
7Only partial compensation was available to victims after the wrecks of Nakhodka (1997), Erika
(1999) and Prestige (2002). In the case of Erika, the percentage of compensation was the highest one
among these three catastrophes: About 80% of the total losses estimated by the experts of the IOPC
Fund. Concerning the Prestige incident, the Executive Committee of the IOPC Fund decided in May
2003 to limit compensation to 15% of the loss actually su¤ered by the respective claimants. On 31th of
March 2004, this level of payments was maintained.
5As a last important point, the 1992 Fund will be complemented by a Supplementary
Fund, which is expected to enter into force before the end of year 2004. Its aim is to
signi…cantly increase the levels of compensation if compensation available through the
Civil Liability Convention and the IOPC Fund should prove insu¢cient. Only states
that receive more than 1 million tons of oil are able to ratify the new convention so that
the number of members of the Supplementary Fund will be signi…cantly lower than the
number of the 1992 Fund. Small countries will be excluded from this new additional
compensation mechanism even if a large oil spill is registered in their territorial waters.
This new Supplementary Fund will also cast doubt on the fact that contributions to the
Funds are relatively fair since fewer …rms will contribute signi…cantly more.
3 Basic model and insurance
Now we propose to analyze the introduction of insurance mechanisms, …rst, and of insur-
ance and …nancial hedging, second, as ways to improve the compensations mechanisms
related to oil spills. In a …rst paragraph, we consider the current situation of the IOPC
Fund, where no insurance is available. Then we introduce hedging mechanisms.
3.1 (Catastrophe) Risk mutualization
Consider n oil …rms located in states that are members of the Fund. We denote e xi the
risk of loss borne by Society when Firm i charters a given boat for the transport of
its oil. This random loss e xi takes the strictly positive value xi with probability pi and
equals zero with probability (1¡pi). Probability pi of incident is a¤ected by the level of
prevention ei decided by the oil …rm that means, here, by the safeness of the chartered
boat: pi = p(ei) with p0(ei) < 0. The cost of prevention is de…ned as c(ei) = ei. Namely,
ei increases as the safeness of the ship chartered by the oil …rm increases. We suppose
that the charterer, i.e. the oil …rm, controls the quality of the boat and the competence of
6the crew8. Finally the aggregate risk of the Fund is e X =
n P
i=1
e xi with values in [0; L] 9 and
with distribution function F(X=e), where e is the vector of all individual investments in
prevention: e ´ (e1; :::en). An increase in the level of individual prevention of, at least,
one …rm improves the distribution in the sense of the …rst order stochastic dominance,
but at a decreasing rate: Fei > 0, Feiei · 0,8X 2 ]0; L[ and Fei(0=e) = Fei(L=e) = 0.
As it works currently, each time an accident is registered in the territorial waters
of its members, the Fund calls for contributions by each oil …rm. The percentage of
contribution of Firm i, denoted ®i, is applied to the level of the agregate loss X of the
pool, up to a maximum value b X, which is assumed to be less than the amount of losses
registered if all chartered boats would have an accident in the same period10: b X < L.
The amount of money available from the IOPC Fund is bounded so that …rms bene…t
from a kind of limited liability.
In thissystem, whose characteristics are similar to the onesof the mutuality principle,
a given …rm does not bear all the risk directly linked to the boat it charters since it is
spread across all members of the Fund.
In addition to the risk ®i e X, …rms have to bear a second risk related to (bad) repu-
tation. Indeed, each time an oil spill occurs, the whole industry is a¤ected by the harsh
public opinion. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of bad reputation is stronger for the …rm that
owned the spilled oil because of the bad advertising which is made around its brand.
Finally, each …rmbears a bad reputational e¤ect composed of an individual e¤ect, which
is zero if the …rm is not implied in the wreck, and a general e¤ect which is positive for
any incident11. Formally, the random variable describing the total reputational e¤ect is
8This may look as a bold hypothesis knowing that maritime oil transport is largely subcontracted
to shipowners. However, charterers get a precise information on the safeness of a boat through the
classi…cation society that has checked it.




We assume that n is su¢ciently large so as to consider e X as a continuous variable.
10This is assumed to re‡ect the fact that the IOPC Fund, as it works, is not able to compensate for
all oil spills.
11Blacconiere and Patten (1994) obtain similar conclusions by studying empirically the impact of the
7denoted ¡g( e X; e xi) with 0 < gX < gxi and gXX < 0. The preferences of the …rm are
represented by a Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function u(:) and it owns an initial
non random wealth wi.
Under the current functioning of the IOPC Fund, the oil …rm can only choose the











u(wi ¡®i b X ¡g(X; e xi))f(X=e)dX ¡ei; (1)
where g(X; e xi) is the expected value of the reputational e¤ect evaluated with respect to
e xi:
g(X; e xi) = p(ei)g(X; xi) +(1¡p(ei))g(X; 0); 8X 2 [0;L] (2)
In the course of the text, we adopt the following notations: wf = wi¡®iX¡g(X; e xi),
c wf = wi ¡®i b X ¡g(X; e xi), gei = gei(X; e xi) and gX = gX(X; e xi). For given prevention
levels of the other oil …rms, the optimal level of prevention e¤
i of Firm i satis…es the


















0(c wf)Fei(X=e)dX = 1 (3)
It is obtained thanks to a di¤erentiation of (1) with respect to ei and thanks to
integrations by part of the terms in fei(:). The left term of Equality (3) is the expected
Bhopal incident in India (1984) on the stock value of chemical …rms in general and on Union Carbide
India Limited (UCIL), which was responsible of the pesticides leak, in particular. SeealsoFreedman and
Stagliano (1991) who show that …rms with a high level of disclosure about their risk-reducing activities
su¤er from a smaller decrease in their stock price after an incident.
8marginal cost of prevention. From our assumptions, this amount is certain and equal
to one. The right-hand-side term is the expected marginal bene…t of prevention. First,
chartering safer boats will reduce the risk of bad reputation (…rst and second term)
because the probability for Firm i to be directly involved in an accident (probability pi)
decreases as ei increases. Second, prevention has also a positive impact on the aggregate
risk of the Fund since it improves its distribution. Firm i will bene…t from an aditionnal
reduction of bad reputation due, this time, to the reduction of the aggregate risk of the
pool (third and fourth term). Lastly, the presence of ®i in the third member of the
right-hand-side term represents the direct bene…t of prevention: increasing prevention
reduces the risk ®i e X borne by Firm i.
This …rst order condition is useful to discuss the impact of a variation of the upper
bound b X of the pool on the willingness of …rms to charter safer boats.
Proposition 1 An increase of the upper bound b X of the funds available for clean-up
and compensation through the pool induces an increase in the level of prevention of Firm
i, other things being equal.
Now we are able to analyze the impact on …rms’ behavior of a change in the upper
limit b X of the Fund. Historically, the cap of the IOPC Fund has been increased just
after the Erika incident, once again during the year 2003, and will still be increased
at the end of 2004 through the implementation of the Supplementary Fund
12. In our
theoretical framework, an increase of b X yields an increase in the level of prevention by
Firm i, other things being equal. Having to pay more for large accidents is similar for
the …rm to bearing more risk. Thus the marginal bene…t of prevention increases, while
the monetary marginal cost of prevention remains unchanged: The price of chartering
safe boats is not a¤ected. Finally, the oil …rm has incentives to increase the level of
preventive investment ei.
12Once this Supplementary Fund enters in force, the total amount of compensation available for
pollution damage in the States that will have rati…ed the Protocol will be 750 million SDR (US$ 1
100 million), including the 203 million SDR (US$ 300 million) available under the 1992 Conventions
(Jacobsson, 2004)..
9Hence increasing the maximum level of contribution by oil …rms to the Fund may
be a good way to increase both the available funds in case of an oil spill and ex ante
prevention. However, this fragilizes the mutuality principle since more aggregate loss is
borne by each individual …rm. Furthermore, small …rms may have some di¢culties to
ful…ll their commitments if their contributions become too high.
Up to now, only the mutualty principle was considered and no insurance in the sense
of risk transfer was available. In what follows, we introduce standard insurance as a way
to increase contributions to the Fund.
3.2 Optimal standard insurance contract
The idea is that …rms may be able to contribute more to the Fund if their random
contributions were insured. From a theoretical point of view, standard insurance could
be bought by each individual …rm or by the pool. Nevertheless, the sta¤ who is in
charge of the management of the IOPC Fund in London has no decision power about
the strategies of oil transport or of boat chartering that the oil …rms may adopt, so that
it is reasonable to assume that oil …rms take insurance decisions, rather than the IOPC
Fund.
Assume that the oil …rm can transfer a part or the whole of its risk ®iX to an
insurer. The compensation function is denoted C(®iX). The insurance premium Q is
equal to the expected costs and indemnities that the insurer will have to take in charge:
Q = (1+¸)E [C(®iX)] where ¸ represents the administrative costs of the insurer plusthe
risk premium per unit of transferred risk and E the expectation operator over X. The
Von Neumann Morgenstern utility function of the insurer is denoted v(:) with v0(:) > 0
and v00(:) · 0 and W is his initial wealth. The compensation function C(:) is de…ned
over [0; ®iL].








u(wi ¡®i(X:1fX· b Xg + b X:1fX> b Xg)




v(W + Q¡(1+ ¸)C(®iX))f(X=e)dX ¸ v(W)
We use optimal control to solve this maximization program. The random variable
X plays the role of time, C(:) is the control variable while the state variable is z(X) =
X R
0
v(W +Q¡(1+ ¸)C(®it))f(t=e)dt: Its evolution is described by the system:
8
> > > <
> > > :
: z(X) = v(W + Q¡(1 +¸)C(®iX))f(X=e)
z(0) = 0
z(L) = v(W)









f (X; b X) = wi ¡®i(X:1fX· b Xg + b X:1fX> b Xg) + C(®iX) ¡Q¡g(X; e xi) and ¹
the Lagrange function. The contract C¤ that maximizes H is presented in Proposition
2 hereafter.
13Function 1f:g is the indicator function, taking value one if the condition into brackets is satis…ed,
zero otherwise.
11Proposition 2
(i) The optimal insurance contract displays a positive deductible when administrative
costs are increasing in the level of indemnities. Marginal compensations for damages











with Ru and Rv the absolute risk aversion ratios of, respectively, the insured and the





Ru + (1+ ¸)Rv
. (7)
(ii) The optimal contract presents a disappearing deductible for losses lower than b X
if the insurer is risk-neutral and an upper limit for losses beyond a level X, with b X < X.
If the insurer is risk averse, the coverage may display a coinsurance rate smaller than
one for damages beyond the deductible and an upper limit of coverage.
Equation (6) is close to the one that Raviv (1979) obtained in a model with one
insurable risk and to that obtained by Gollier (1996) with background risk. But in our
model, the risk ofbad reputation isuninsurable and itdepends positively on the insurable
risk (we have gX > 0). Thus we should expect that the insured …rm accepts to pay for a
higher coverage of the …rst risk in order to protect itself against its background risk if it
is prudent in the sense of Kimball (1990).. Here, we obtain a similar result, but prudence
is not necessary. In our model the second risk, g, is completely de…ned by the …rst one,
X, so that for a given xi, both variables have the same distribution. Formally, the fact
that the insured …rm asks for more insurance than in a case without reputationnal e¤ect
is illustrated by the presence of gX, positive, at the numerator of C(:). It is as if the
insured …rm would bear an individual “aggregate” risk, ®iX +g(X; e xi), which cannot be
completely insured. Besides, the presence of the uninsurable reputational risk explains
why indemnities can increase with X even if the insurable loss borne by the …rm (its
12contribution to the Fund) is…xed and equal to®i b X. This resultisalso due to the positive
correlation between g and ®iX.14
What is di¤erent from the literature on background risk is that we are dealing with
catastrophe risks. Hence an insurer whose portfolio contains the aggregate risk of the
Fund bears an additional risk of insolvency following a catastrophe that he has accepted
to cover. Besides, empirical facts show that reinsurance groups that accept to cover
pollution damages ask for high insurance premia, which entails high risk premia. It is
often argued that the management of large risks entails additional transaction costs, due
to risks of insolvency or to the complexity of audits and of claims settlements. This may
justify the signi…cant increase in the price of classical insurance. In such an economic
environment, it is unreasonable to assume that the insurer behaves as a risk-neutral
agent. He is more likely to be risk averse and his administrative costs related to the
management of catastrophe risks are su¢ciently high to argue that, in most cases, the
optimal insurance contract displays coinsurance between the insurer and the insured
…rm beyond a deductible level. In other terms, a disappearing deductible, which induces
that indemnities increase more rapidly than the loss, is seldom the best contract. This
result is rather intuitive since such a contract would compell the insurer to pay really
high indemnities in the case of a catastrophic event. Figure 1 displays the coinsurance
contract.
——————————
Figure 1 about here
——————————
It is still interesting to notice that a contract with coinsurance beyond a deductible
may also be the best risk sharing when the insurer bears convex administrative costs,
as shown by Raviv (1979).. If the convexity assumption is not the most plausible when
dealing with classical risks such as car- or house-insurance risks, it is much more closer
14For gX = 0, we would have b C¤0(:) = 0 for any X larger than b X and b X = X.
13to reality when we focus on large risks. Consequently, convex costs may also explain the
optimality of coinsurance in the management of large risks15.
Another important result of this section deals with the optimal level of prevention
when isnurance is available. Formally, after a di¤erentiation of (4) with respect to eC
i ,
integrations by part applied to the terms in fei(:) yield the following …rst order condition


































Proposition 3 When the insurer can obtain information on the risk-reducing activities
of the …rm, the optimal level of prevention decided by the …rm increases compared to a
situation where no insurance is available.
This last result is not surprising. Here, the insurer can obtain information about the
level of prevention decided by the …rm: When a given boat is chartered, its capacity and
its safeness become common knowledge because maritime authorities di¤use the results
of the control. Consequently, the insurer is able to de…ne a premium which depends on
the level of prevention chosen by the oil …rm16. If insurance is available, an increase in
the level of prevention decreases the level of the premium. In our model, an increase
15This assumption is not retained here. With a cost function more general than the one we are using,
the parameter ¸ would be replaced by the …rst derivative of the cost function and the second derivative
would appear at the denominator of Equation (6).
16In other words, the insurance premium depends on the safeness of the chartered boat in our ap-
proach. This characteristic implies that the insurance contrat is self-enforcable: Once the contract is
underwritten, the insured …rm has no incentive to choose a level of care lower than the one considered
by the insurer when de…ning the price of insurance. This is consistent with the maritime oil insurance
sector. Indeed only a few companies are specialized in such a coverage so that the sector is relatively
14in prevention has also an e¤ect on the marginal indemnities through its impact on the
non insurable risk. Indeed, the marginal level of the bad reputation risk g appears in
C0(®iX). Hence as in standard models with complete information on prevention, the
…rm improves the prevention when it has access to insurance.
Finally, when only standard insurance is available, insurers may ask for high risk
premia for accepting to manage a catastrophe risk and the optimal contract displays
some coinsurance: As the damage increases, oil …rms are less well covered and have to
bear more and more residual risk. Hence our aim, which was to use insurance coverage
in order to provide more available funds in the case of a huge incident (which means that
the cap b X of the pool could have been increased) can be di¢cult to achieve. If standard
insurance is too costly, oil …rms may prefer not to be insured at all.
4 Providing a better hedging strategy through capi-
tal markets
In this section, the issue is to …nd complementary mechanisms that are able to diversify
risks over a wider range of individuals and to transfer risk to agents such as …nancial
investors. In this way, itwill be possible toreduce the residual risk borne by the …rmafter
(standard) insurance and to increase available funds for victims in case of an accident.
In a …rst paragraph, we provide our results related to mixed hedging strategies. In the
second subsection, we discuss the …nancial implications.
4.1 The optimal mixed strategy
A more complete hedging strategy would consist in combining several coverage instru-
ments. Doherty and Dionne (1993) and Mahul (2002) provide such an approach by
concentrated. In such a situation if a …rm cheats, the insurer will break the contract and the …rm will
have many di¢culties to …nd another insurer who accepts to o¤er it an insurance contract with a fair
price. Besides, cheating will have a negative impact on the reputation of the oil …rm.
15dividing the risk into two components: an idiosyncratic risk, which can be related to
the speci…c activities of a given …rm, and a systematic risk, related to the risk of the
industry as a whole. While the individual risk can be insured by a standard insurance
policy, the systematic risk is managed through a participating contract. A participating
contract is a policy with a variable premium based on the realized systematic loss. In a
second stage, the variability of the insurance premiumis hedged either through standard
insurance or thanks to adequate …nancial instruments.
Our framework is di¤erent from the ones of Doherty and Dionne (1993) and Mahul
(2002) because 1) The oil industry does not bear an insurable idiosyncratic risk since the
e¤ect of bad reputation, which plays this role, is non insurable, 2) The individual risk of
the oil …rm is correlated to the risk of the Fund, while in the quoted analyses both are
independent, and 3) Prevention is absent from the models of Doherty and Dionne and
of Mahul while it plays an important role in our work.
Now, assume that the oil Fund, representing all contributing …rms, has to pay for all
oil spills, whatever their size. This means that no upper limit of compensation exists ( b X
does no longer hold) and, as a direct consequence, that oil …rms are no longer protected
by limited liability. Nevertheless, the …rm can still transfer part of its risk to an insurer,
and it can also invest on …nancial markets in order to cover losses (contributions to the
Fund) in excess of the insurance coverage17. Here we want to limit the implication of the
insurer in the coverage of large risks in order to mitigate his bankruptcy risk. Recall that
in the previous section we have shown that su¢cientrisk aversion ofthe insurer leads him
to o¤er a contract with an upper limit of insurance when dealing with catastrophe risks.
We take this result as given here: We denote I(:) the indemnity schedule and X the
level of damage such that any contribution higher than X induces the same indemnity.
17Another way to deal with such acon…guration would be to let …rms be protected by limited liability,
that means that individual contributions are still limited to ®i b X. Nevertheless the Fund would have to
pay for all damages so that it would have strong incentives to go on …nancial markets in order to …nd
the additionnal needed funds. However such a con…guration would have no impact on the oil …rms in
terms of prevention, so that we do not consider it here.
16Formally, when an oil spill occurs and after having contributed to the Fund, the oil …rm
obtains an indemnity I(®iX) if its contribution is less than ®iX and the …xed amount
I = I(®iX) for any larger contribution.
Still assume that the …rm can sell to an external investor a part ¯ of its residual
risk minus the deductible
18, which is always to be borne by the …rm in order to avoid
moral hazard problems
19, for any damage higher than X: ®iX ¡I ¡ D
¯.
20 The price
of this risk transfer is denoted ¼: It depends on ¯ and also on the level of prevention ei
adopted by the …rm. In this model, …nancial markets can obtain some information about
environmental policies adopted by the …rms21. We have ¼ = ¼(¯; ei) and it satis…es the
properties ¼¯ > 0 and ¼ei < 0.22 Lastly, the insurer’s unit cost of insurance is now ± and
it depends on ¯: if the insured commits to cover the worst states of nature on …nancial
markets, the insurer takes into account this information when evaluating the insurance
premium. Such a behavior implies that …rms communicate with the insurer on their
…nancial strategy. From an empirical point of view, this is rather usual when looking
at the pollution insurance market. Insurers ask for more and more informations about
the risk-reducing activities of the …rms and …rms collaborate most of the time in order
to obtain adequate coverage. In our model, the consequences of a catastrophe are now
18By buying and selling puts and calls of appropriate underlying securities. See the discussion at the
end of this section.
19Indeed this allows us to avoid some discontinuity of the indemnity schedule at point D¯ (see Figure
2).
20Thanks to the forthcoming results on the design of the optimal indemnity function for losses less
than the upper bound X, wewill be able to show thatthe scalar ®iX¡I¡D¯ is always positive. Indeed,
D¯ is the deductible imbedded in the indemnity function so that I(®iX) = h(®iX)¡D¯. Furthermore




and that 0 · h0(®iX) < 1 at optimum.
Hence we have that I < ®iX ¡D¯.
21See Lanoie et al. (1998) for details about how those informations are released on …nancial markets
and their impact.
22The decrease of ¼ as prevention increases re‡ects the fact that …nancial investors aresensitive tothe
environmental policies adopted by the …rms and that they take them into account when they evaluate
the riskyness of the …rms’ activities. Several …nancial works have proven that this point holds in reality
(see for instance Blacconiere and Patten (1994), Cormier and Magnan (1997) and Lanoie et al. (1998)).
17split between the insurer and …nancial markets. As a direct consequence, the costs of
risk management for the insurer are lower than in the previous case because of a decrease
in the risk premium. Formally, we have: ±(¯) > 0;±(0) = ¸ and ±(¯) < ¸ 8¯ > 0.






















v(W +Q¯ ¡(1+ ±(¯))I(®iX))f(X=e)dX
+v(W + Q¯ ¡(1+±(¯)):I)(1 ¡F(X=e)) ¸ v(W);
with Q¯ = (1 + ±(¯))E [I(®iX)] the insurance premium. The …rm has to choose the
combined hedging strategy (I(:);¯) that maximizes its expected net utility subject to
the participation of the insurer.
Proposition 4
(i) The optimal indemnity function displays a positive deductible D¯. Marginal in-











with Ru and Rv the absolute risk aversion ratios of, respectively, the insured and the
insurer.
(ii) For given risk atitudes of both agents and positive hedging from the …nancial mar-
ket, the optimal coverage is higher than the one obtained when only standard insurance
is available: D
¯ < D and I
¤0(®iX) > C
¤0(®iX) for any loss ®iX partially covered and
less than ®iX.
18(iii) For a given insurance deductible D¯, an increase in the …nancing of large losses
by …nancial markets increases standard insurance of medium losses.
Point iii) suggests that …rms should use the wide diversi…cation capability of …nancial
marketsto manage the potential large consequences driven by catastrophe risks and they
should buy standard insurance for small and medium losses. In the speci…c framework
of the oil industry, what we commonly call the 1992 IOPC Fund is composed of two
distinct funds. The …rst one, the general Fund, is dedicated to the payment of the
current administrative costs and to the compensation of small oil spills (less than 4
millions SDRs with one Special Drawing Right = US$ 1.46375 on 5 May 2004), while
the main claims Fund is dedicated to large oil spills. Finally the general Fund should
negociate some coverage conditions o¤ered by standard insurers, while the main claims
Fund should rather be managed through interventions on capital markets.
Figure 2 displays an example of an optimal combined contract.
——————————
Figure 2 about here
——————————
For convenience we use in what follows the notation g(X; e xi) ´ g and ¼(¯; ei) ´ ¼.
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w1
f = wi ¡®iX ¡Q¯ + I(®iX) ¡g ¡¼
w2














Function 1f:g is the indicator function, which takes value one if the condition into
brackets is satis…ed, zero otherwise.
19Equation (11)isobtained by di¤erentiating (9)with respectto ¯. (Partial)external …-
nancing isoptimal if the expected marginal cost of an increase in ¯ (left-hand-side-term)
equals the expected marginal bene…t, obtained thanks to an increase in the coverage of
the small and medium losses (…rst member in the right-hand-side-term), to the direct
increase of the coverage of large losses (second member) and to the decrease of the price
of standard insurance (third member).
Lastly, we have to discuss the level of prevention adopted by the …rm in the case of a
joint hedging contract. A di¤erentiation of (9) with respect to e¯, the level of prevention





















Proposition 5 The level of prevention adopted by the …rm is higher than the one ob-
tained in the model with standard insurance when the opportunity of announcing its
risk-reduction policy to markets induces easier access to external …nancing (¼ei < 0).
4.2 Financial insights
So far, we have demonstrated the conditions under which …nancial hedging may supple-
ment insurance mechanisms to enhance the management of oil pollution risk. Two main
topics remain to be discussed. First of all, we show why these conditions are likely to be
met empirically, i.e. why …nancial instruments may be attractive to both investors and
oil companies. Then, we discuss the design of the …nancial instruments adapted to oil
pollution risks and its consequences on the level of environment prevention.
One reason thatisoften evoked to explain the limited ability ofreinsurance companies
to handle catastrophe risk is the insu¢cient available funds of the sector compared to
the size of capital markets (see for instance Froot (2001)). This problem of credit risk
20translates into the inability of the reinsurer to ful…l its obligation to oil companies if
a catastrophe should occur. Although losses incurred under the current international
maritime regime are far lower than hurricane or earthquake losses, the implementation
of the Supplementary Fund23 will make oil companies even more sensitive to oil pollution
risk. According to some executives of the Marsh Company, a world leader of business
risk management and insurance broking, even the biggest oil companies are now aware of
the needs to hedge this kind of risk. Indeed, the Supplementary Fund introduces a third
tier that sets the total amount of compensation payable for any incident to a combined
total of 750 million Special Drawing Rights (just over US$1,000 million) including the
amount of compensation paid under the existing CLC/Fund Convention. This is more
than three times as large as the current limit. Furthermore, this third tier will be taken
over by a few companies since the supplementary fund is likely to be rati…ed only by
European countries and Japan24. This in turn means that the mutuality principle is
weakened and splitting the total risk by issuing adequate …nancial instruments is likely
to become less costly than insurance coverage.
On the supply side, investors are likely to be attracted by instruments of which
distributions of payo¤s have a weak (nil) correlation with other …nancial assets. This
o¤ers a unique opportunity for diversi…cation. Actually, this argument applies to all
kinds of catastrophe risk. The only di¤erence is the anthropic feature of oil pollution
risk: It depends on weather conditions, on the location of the wreck but also on human
activity through the safeness of the chartered boats or an act of sabotage. But one can
hardly imagine that this could challenge the opportunity to invest in such assets. The
amount X of compensation available is assessed by independent experts and eligibility
for compensation could be easily rejected if a speci…c incident should be proven to be
deliberate. Opportunities to in‡uence …nancial quotations seem to be very unlikely.
23See Footnote 4.
24As already mentionned earlier in the paper, recall that the protocol will enter in force three months
after eight countries at least rati…ed it. Only countries receiving more than 1,000,000 tons a year can
join the Supplementary Fund convention. By May 20th 2004, Norway and Denmark have rati…ed the
Supplementary Fund.
21The development of catastrophe assets is also explained by their ability to reduce
transaction costs, especially they mitigate the moral hazard problem at the expense
of increasing the basis risk. For instance, the CBOT contracts are de…ned on various
industry indice losses, so that an individual …rm (an insurance company) has no (or a
weak) incentive to declare excess losses because it will only marginally bene…t from this
behavior. This argument of agency cost mitigation is less appealing in the context of oil
pollution risks since the IOPC Fund already applies the mutuality principle. The total
amount of compensation X is assessed from all incidents that occurred within a year and
its estimation is not contested by oil companies. In this perspective, there is no clear
advantage of …nancial instruments compared to reinsurance. Note however that …nancial
instruments suitable with the coverage of oil pollution risk do not increase basis risk.
Figure 2 depicts the optimal hedging strategy when both insurance policies and …-
nancial instruments are available. It also shows the shape of the payo¤s of the …nancial
instruments that will …t with oil pollution risks. The coverage provided by …nancial in-
struments (¯(®iX¡D
¯¡I)) corresponds to the design of a call option. The underlying
asset would correspond to X (or more precisely ®iX), that is the total compensation
paid by the oil industry during a year within the international regime. The strike price
could be set to b X. One main di¤erence would be the slope of the payo¤ (¯) which is
lower than 1, the slope of usual option contracts. This simply means that instead of
getting the di¤erence between the index value and the striking price, the buyer of the
option would get only a percentage ¯ from it.
To enhance the attractiveness and the liquidity of such contracts, one can imagine
to build stop loss contracts. In the option context, this would correspond to a bundle
of call options. For instance, one can create a bull spread by buying a call option on
the index X with a certain strike price and selling a call option on the same index with
a higher strike price. This is a good example of the advantages of securitization which
allows to decompose and repackage risk (see Doherty and Schlesinger(2002) for a general
presentation). Indeed, the call option on X can be decomposed in a set of adequate bull
spreads, as illustrated on Figure 3.
22——————————
Figure 3 about here
——————————
Thisdecomposition has atleasttwo advantages. On the one hand, the investor would
limit his risk exposure. On the other hand, it facilitates standardization. Indeed, among
the characteristics of the call option that we described just above, most of them were
speci…c to each company. The percentage of contribution to the IOPC fund ®i depends
on the level of activity of Firm i whereas X results from the maximization program of
Firm i. The decomposition of total risk enables each …rm to limit its basis risk by selling
the desired risk exposure.
Earlier on, we have supposed that the cost ¼ of the …nancial instruments depends
on the level of prevention ei of Firm i. Unless tailored-made …nancial contracts are
proposed to a …rm, a successful market of oil pollution hedging instruments requires
standardization. The latter is reckoned as a key advantage of …nancial markets since it
enables to reduce transaction costs and increase liquidity. This implies that the cost ¼
will depend on the prevention adopted by the whole sector (e) and not only on ei.
5 Conclusion
The new …rms’ management of risks tries to encompass all types of risks. Firms have
to cope with numerous sources of uncertainties, linked to the production process, to
unanticipated market evolutions, non expected internal organization issues and also with
uncertainties related to the existence of large risks. Large risks are often catastrophe
risks. These are characterized by low frequency but may induce very large economic
consequences, irreversible ecological damages and sometimes loss of human lifes. This
is the case for the maritime transport of oil. To manage oil spills, the 1992 IOPC
Fund calls for ex post contributions by each oil …rm belonging to a member state of the
Fund. However, no insurance mechanism is designed and only the mutuality principle is
applied: The individual contribution corresponds to a percentage of the aggregate risk
23of the Fund. Because of the limited number of members and also of the huge …nancial
consequences induced by some oil spills, the aggregate risk cannot be fully spread across
the oil …rms. Hence it is useful to think about other diversi…cation and/or coverage
instruments that would help to smooth the payments of …rms through time and also
to increase the funds available for compensation. In this paper, we have shown that
transferring part of the aggregate risk, namely the part related to catastrophic losses,
to investors that have access to capital markets makes standard insurance of small and
medium oil spills less costly. The mixed strategy, which consists in using the properties
of standard insurance for risks that are reasonably insurable and the wide capability
of …nancial markets to diversify risk across many people in the world for catastrophic
losses, seems to be a good compromise. Moreover if …rms can send to markets signals on
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Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that wf = wi ¡®iX ¡ g(X; e xi), c wf = wi ¡ ®i b X ¡g(X; e xi), gei = gei(X; e xi),
gX = gX(X; e xi).. The e¤ect on prevention of a variation in b X is obtained thanks to a






















With Reiei the derivative of Rei with respect to ei.
From (2) we have that gei < 0. By de…nition we also have that gX > 0: An increase
in the aggregate loss X of the Fund deteriorates the reputation of all …rms. Finally, with
Fei positive the numerator of (13) is strictly positive for a risk-averse, or risk-neutral,
oil …rm. The denominator is obtained thanks to a di¤erentiation of (3) w.r.t. ei. With
g = g(X; e xi) and







































25Function 1f:g is the indicator function, taking value one if the condition into brackets is satis…ed,
zero otherwise.
28From the de…nition (2) of g(X; e xi), we have that geiX = gXei = 0. Finally, an






























By assumption, we have Feiei · 0, gX > 0 and u00 < 0. Besides, geiei is equal to
peiei:(g(X;xi)¡g(X; 0)) (see Equation (2)). Function g(X; :) is increasing in xi and peiei
is positive or equal to zero, so that geiei is positive. Finally Reiei is negative (the second
order conditions are satis…ed) and dei=d b X given by (13) is positive. Proposition 1 is
demonstrated.
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimality conditions related to optimal control that must be satis…ed are
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :





(iii) z(0) = 0
(iv) z(L) = v(W)
and HC = 0; 8X such that 0 < C(®iX) < ®iX. From (5) we have Hz = 0 so that ¹ is
constant. Conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) are also satis…ed. Because f(X=e) is always posi-
tive by de…nition, it ispossible to work with the simpli…ed Hamiltonien H
¤ = H=f(X=e).







f (X; b X)) ¡¹(1+ ¸)v
0(W
C
f ) = 0 (14)
29with wC
f (X; b X) = wi¡®iX:1fX· b Xg¡®i b X:1fX> b Xg+C(®iX)¡Q¡g(X; e xi) and W C
f =
W +Q¡(1+¸)C(®iX).
First, we have to show that the optimal contract displays a positive deductible.
Let us de…ne as J(X) the function given by (14) and evaluated at C(®iX) = 0 and
K(X) the same function but evaluated at C(®iX) = ®iX. By di¤erentiationg them
w.r.t. X it is easy to show that J(X) is increasing in X and K(X) is decreasing.
Moreover, both functions are equal at point X = 0. Denote them m at this point:
m = u0(wi ¡ Q) ¡ ¹(1 + ¸)v0(W + Q). Two cases must be considered : either m is
negative or m is positive (the trivial case for which m = 0 is not analyzed).
¨ m > 0
Since J(:) is increasing in X, m is the smallest value it can take. Thus J is always
positive and C(®iX) = 0 isnever optimal26. Besides, K(:) isdecreasing in X. Then there
exists a positive level of damage X such that K is positive on [0;X] and C(®iX) = ®iX
is optimal on this interval. For damages higher than X, K becomes negative: from this
point, coverage must be constant and an upper limit of insurance is optimal.
¨ m < 0
In this case, K(X) is always negative and full coverage is never optimal. Besides,
there exists a level of damage D such that J(X) is negative on [0; D] and presents partial
coverage for any damage higher than D. A positive deductible D is optimal.
Following Raviv (1979), we can show that, at …xed insurance premium, a contract
with full insurance ofsmall lossesand an upperlimitforlargerdamages isalwaysstochas-
tically dominated by pure coinsurance when insurance is costly (namely when ¸ > 0).
The intuition is that the risk averse insured prefers a transfer of indemnities of small
damagesto higheroneswhen insurance iscostly. In the same spirit, a deductible contract
dominates a pure coinsurance contract in the sense of the second order stochastic dom-
inance (Gollier and Schlesinger (1996)). Hence, the optimal contract displays a strictly




f ) < 0. The second order conditions are satis…ed and the
result holds.
30Now, we have tode…ne the optimal marginal indemnities beyond the deductible level.













































Ru + (1 +¸):Rv
With Ru = ¡u00(wC
f )=u0(wC
f ) and Rv = ¡v00(W C
f )=v0(W C
f ). Equation (6) of Point i) is
demonstrated. Equation (7) in Point i) is obtained thanks to an identical reasoning,





f = wi ¡ ®i b X + C(®iX) ¡ Q ¡ g(X; e xi). If the insurer
is risk neutral we have Rv equal to zero and C¤0(®iX) = 1+
gX
®i for losses less than b X
and C¤0(®iX) =
gX
®i for losses higher than b X. Since all terms are positive, the slope of




and partially covered is larger






¤0 is still positive but it decreases as X increases because gXX is negative.
Consequently, from a level of damage X larger than b X, marginal indemnities are close
to zero and the compensation function displays a kind of upper limit.
If the insurer is risk averse and asks for a large risk premium, which means that ¸ is





is optimal. Point (ii) of Proposition 2 is demonstrated.
Proof of Proposition 3




















































0(®iX) are alwayslowerthan orequal to1+
gX
®i atoptimum
(see Equation (6)), while b C
0(®iX) is always lower than or equal to
gX
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(1+¸)CX(X; b X)Fei(X=eC)dX, which is negative. We also have that QC = (1+¸)











































The second order conditions of this problem are satis…ed (the computation is similar
to the one presented in the proof of Proposition 1), so that R
C
eiei is negative. Finally,
dei
dC
is positive and Proposition 1 is demonstrated.
32Proof of Proposition 4
The control variable is I(®iX) and the state variable is z(X) =
X R
0
v(W + Q¯ ¡(1+









with °(X) the Lagrange function, w1
f = wi¡®iX¡Q¯+I(®iX)¡g(X; e xi)¡¼(¯; ei);
w2




¡g(X; e xi)¡¼(¯; ei) and W
¯
f = W +Q¯ ¡
(1+ ±(¯))I(®iX).. Parameter D
¯ is the optimal level of the deductible in this model.
Function 1fX>Xg is the indicator function, which takes value 1 when the condition into
brackets is satis…ed, zero otherwise. Still here, the Lagrange function is a constant
(H¯¤














f ) = 0 (17)
Thanks to a proof similar to that proposed for Proposition 2, we can …rst show that
the optimal level D¯ is positive as long as insurance is costly (± > 0).
Second, by di¤erentiating Equality (17) w.r.t. X and using it to de…ne ° we must
















































f ). Point i) is demonstrated.
For point ii), we know that ± is decreasing in ¯ and that ±(0) = ¸. The marginal
indemnities I¤0 and C¤0 (given by (6)) di¤er from the term ± that appears at the denom-
inator of I¤0. Hence I¤0 is always higher than C¤0 when ¯ is positive. Furthermore, at
33point X = D we have that the derivative of the hamiltonien associated to the standard
insurance program (in Section 3), H¤
C jX=D, equals zero:
H
¤
C jX=D = u
0(w ¡Q¡®iD ¡g(D; e xi)) ¡(1+ ¸)°v
0(W +Q) = 0 (19)
Besides, the derivative of the hamiltonien associated to the mixed strategy program
and evaluated at X = D and I = 0 is written:
H
¤
I jX=D = u
0(w ¡Q
¯ ¡®iD ¡g(D; e xi) ¡¼) ¡(1+±)°v
0(W +Q
¯) (20)
Now we follow the reasoning for a …xed insurance premium. In other words, we are
wondering about the variation of the deductible level as mixed hedging strategies become
available but for a same cost of insurance as in the standard case. Knowing that ± < ¸,
¼ ¸ 0 and that u0(:) is decreasing in wealth, a comparison of (19) and (20) allows us
to conclude that H¤
I jX=D is positive. By deriving this expression with respect to D,
we obtain that H¤
I jX=D is increasing in D, so that the deductible must decrease in (20)
in order to obtain satis…ed …rst order conditions (H¤
I jX=D¯ = 0). Hence we have that
D¯ < D.
Point iii) is immediate. From (18), marginal indemnities increase as ¯ increases and,
at a …xed premium, the deductible decreases. Indeed, a total di¤erentiation of (17)










Proposition 4 is demonstrated.
Proof of Proposition 5






which is positive. By taking this positive terminto account when looking at the expected
marginal bene…t of prevention and by applying the same reasoning as in the proof of
Point ii) of Proposition 3, Proposition 5 is demonstrated.
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